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Book Review

Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism,
by Gary E. Varner. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xv + 336. H/b £40.23.
The Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by Robert W. Lurz. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2009. Pp. 320. P/b £20.21.

It seems to be a widely held belief that we should not try to trap, kill, and eat any creature that
can relate the story of its close call. While this turns out to be a good rule from the perspective
of R. M. Hare’s version of utilitarianism, other intuitive-level rules about the proper treatment of
sentient beings require revision, or so Gary Varner argues in his recent book Personhood,
Ethics, and Animal Cognition. After defending Hare’s two-level utilitarianism in the first section,
Varner turns to the question of the kinds of beings who worthy of kinds of concern, and in the
final section he applies Hare’s theory to issues of animal agriculture. While Varner answers
questions about whether we can eat some animals (maybe so) or factory farm any (probably
not), significant work is done in the second section to defend claims about the cognitive and
affective properties of animals. Varner argues that probably all vertebrates are conscious and
hence are worthy of moral concern, though since no animals are persons with a narrative sense
of self, they are not moral agents. Key to this section is the introduction of a middle category—
near-persons. Near-persons occupy a middle ground in the moral hierarchy between the merely
sentient and persons. Chimpanzees, dolphins, elephants and scrub jays qualify as nearpersons, as might rats, monkeys and parrots—and these are the animals that we probably
ought not make a regular meal of.

1. Animals are conscious
Varner uses an argument from analogy to conclude that animals feel pain, and hence are
conscious. Like humans, vertebrates and cephalopods (such as octopus, squid, and cuttlefish)
(1) have nociceptors that are connected to the brain, (2) have a natural opioid-releasing system
in the body, (3) are responsive to analgesics, and (4) demonstrate appropriate pain behaviour.
Varner is aware of the limitations of analogical arguments, and he attempts to bolster his by
adding a ‘guiding theory’ to the initial reference properties. Following a suggestion of Colin
Allen, Varner suggests that the ability to distinguish between the sensory type of pain
(throbbing, stabbing, aching) and the intensity of pain (vaguely annoying, intense, unbearable)
would be beneficial to the organism, and that there is evidence for such abilities among some
mammals (monkeys and rats).
As part of his argument for animal consciousness, Varner endorses a higher order thought
(HOT) theory of consciousness. He worries that first order representational theories of
consciousness might lead to bloat, and Varner also suggests that his evolutionary account of

the benefits of thinking differently about the affective and sensory components of pain relies on
a HOT account. However, it is not clear why first order accounts (as well as nonrepresentational
accounts of consciousness) are incompatible with the distinction between affective and sensory
components of pain. Given the arguments made by Peter Carruthers (‘Brute Experience’, The
Journal of Philosophy, 86 (1989), pp. 258–69) that HOT theories entail that animals are not
conscious because they lack the requisite metacognitive abilities, adopting a HOT theory raises
problems which are not addressed.
Varner also examines evidence for animal consciousness by examining types of learning.
Because humans report conscious experience in some types of learning situations, such as
trace conditioning (a type of classical conditioning in which a sound is presented a fraction of a
second before a puff of air is aimed at the subject’s eye), when an animal such as a rabbit
learns as a human does, Varner concludes that the animal is conscious. Similar arguments are
made for a number of different learning strategies, including multiple reversal trials, probability
learning, and the formation of learning sets. Varner writes, ‘It also seems plausible to say that
each of these kinds of learning requires consciousness, in so far as each involves hypothesis
formation and testing, and human subjects report that they do this consciously’ (Varner 2012, p.
131). Here Varner is relying on human introspection on the method they use to solve problems.
Given the human tendency toward confabulation, introspection about the means one uses to
solve a problem may not be entirely reliable.
2. But animals do not tell stories about themselves
While animals may be conscious, they are not persons. A person is someone who can narrate
her own life to herself, who can set long-term goals, and work to achieve them. Varner is deeply
influenced by the work of Marya Schechtman, and he accepts that a person must be rational,
self-conscious, autonomous in the sense of having second-order desires, and must be a moral
agent. In addition, a person must have the following four concepts from which to construct a
self-narrative: self, birth, death, and personality. (It is not clear whether one must believe in
personality; if not, this account of personhood raises serious questions about the moral standing
of situationists!) These criteria lead Varner to accept the hypothesis that language is necessary
for being a person. He considers artificial language research on great apes, dolphins, and
parrots and concludes that there is no evidence of storytelling among those species. However,
Varner does suggest that cetaceans and elephants may be telling stories that we do not yet
understand, because they have complex vocalization systems that have not been decoded yet
by scientists. Apes are excluded from this possibility, given that they lack complex vocalizations.
This highlights a possibility not addressed in this discussion, namely that language evolved from
gestures rather than from simple vocalizations (as advocated by, for example, Michael Corballis
and Michael Arbib). It is premature to dismiss the notion that apes have preliminary narrative
abilities without considering the rich literature on ape gestural communication.
Varner admits that he has a high standard for being a person, and that children may not acquire
the cognitive abilities associated with narrative selves until adolescence. However, he thinks no
worries emerge from this—since children will become persons, we have reasons for treating
them as ‘persons in training’ (p. 180).

3. Though some animals do have a theory of mind
Near-persons do not construct self-narratives, but they do have one key element of narrative—
the ability to engage in past and future thinking. The ability is relevant for utilitarians because
consciously re-experiencing pleasurable experiences and fulfilling long-term plans results in
more happiness, whereas unhappiness arises from consciously dreading unpleasant
experiences and failing in one’s goals. Varner thinks that there is evidence that some species
are able to engage in some kind of autonoetic consciousness—the psychologist Endel Tulving’s
term for the ability to consciously re-experience one’s own past, consciously preview one’s
future, and to have a personal sense of the present self. Episodic memory—autnoetic
consciousness of the past—is contrasted with semantic memory, which only involves
remembering some facts about the world. Varner’s review of the literature leads him to conclude
that many species have episodic memory and a present sense of self.
For evidence of future thinking Varner turns to the theory of mind (ToM) literature. Theory of
mind—or mindreading—is narrowly understood as the ability to attribute beliefs and desires to
others in order to predict their behaviour, though Varner adopts a wider understanding by
including attribution of perceptions, goals, and a feeling of sympathy. Varner also diverges from
the normal way of discussing mindreading by presuming it to be conscious. Often theory of mind
is taken to be an implicit theory that we unconsciously use, like the rules of grammar that shape
our use of language but which we do not have direct introspective access to.
Varner’s review of the mindreading literature leads him to conclude that monkeys and apes
have the ability to attribute perceptual states to others, a conclusion that is shared by a number
of scientists. However, his conclusion that elephants, dolphins, and scrub jays also mindread is
based on anecdotes, and on studies with very small sample sizes. In this section of the book
Varner seems to prefer clever animals to killjoy explanations. For example, Varner discusses
Nathan Emery and Nicky Clayton’s study on scrub jays that found that when jays who were
former pilferers hid food in the presence of another jay, they would later move the food when no
one was watching. Jays who had not had the experience of stealing food did not tend to move
food that they hid in the presence of a competitor. While the scientists think the evidence is
suggestive that the scrub jays engage in a kind of experience projection—a simulation version
of mindreading—Varner is more convinced, writing ‘it is unclear how else to explain this striking
result than by saying that the jays were using ToM’ (p. 214). However, there are always
alternative explanations that can be given for such behaviour, in humans and in nonhumans
alike. The scrub jays who moved their food could have learned about behavior without having
learned about mental states, making an association between the presence of a competitor and
the loss of food. The cognitive achievement would come from remembering one’s past pilfering,
forming the association, and then flipping the roles of self and competitor. However, shifting
roles need not involve thinking about any of the things included in Varner’s definition of ToM.
While Varner concludes that at least great apes, dolphins, elephants and corvids are nearpersons and deserve special moral significance, the practical consequence of this status is not
discussed. In the sequel Sustaining Animals: Envisioning Humane, Sustainable Communities
(forthcoming from Oxford University Press), Varner promises to defend the claim that near-

persons can be used in some biomedical research, and that wildlife policy should treat nearpersons as replaceable, because the consequences of giving them a right to life would be
terrible. But what about chimpanzee actors, dolphin swimming programs, or elephant laborers?
Varner asks us to stay tuned for answers to these sorts of questions.
4. Contemporary debates about animal minds
The fourteen philosophers whose essays make up the collection The Philosophy of Animal
Minds share Varner’s interest in the cognitive capacity of nonhuman animals, and the book
offers a valuable resource for anyone wanting to delve deeper into the question of animal
minds.
While Varner spends much time defending the claim that animals are conscious, that issue is
largely taken for granted by the authors in this volume. The exception is Rocco J. Gennaro, who
attempts to rehabilitate HOT theories to make them applicable to animals without metacognition
proper. By appealing to the same data on episodic memory that Varner discusses, Gennaro
argues that those species who show evidence of episodic memory must have at least a minimal
self-concept of something that endures through time. Such I-concepts can be used to form a
kind of higher-order thought, Gennaro argues, that suffices for consciousness on a HOT theory.
It is not clear whether Varner can adopt Gennaro’s solution to the HOT problem of animal
consciousness, given his rejection of animal persons or selves. Gennaro describes the Iconcept that animals have as an understanding of one’s self as an enduring, thinking thing,
along the lines of Varner’s narrative sense of self. David DeGrazia’s essay also defends selfconsciousness in animals, suggesting that some species have a proto-understanding of agency
along with complex social understanding of self and other in various social roles.
Despite these suggestions that some species have a more robust sense of consciousness than
Varner wants to admit, neither Gennaro nor DeGrazia goes so far as to claim that animals have
language, which Varner thinks is required for a narrative sense of self. In his article ‘What do
animals think?’ Dale Jamieson agrees that animals are not ‘relentless story-tellers’ (p. 33) but
thinks little hinges on that fact. He takes an interpretationist approach and challenges the
traditional view of content as something hidden within the body ready to be discovered. Fido,
like the human, has a coherence in action and belief and can revise his behaviour as he is
confronted with new circumstances, and that is all an interpretationist need be concerned with.
Several authors in the collection argue that there is evidence that animals have beliefs. It may
be that belief, rather than language, is what is necessary for building a self-narrative. Eric Saidel
argues that animals have beliefs and desires, and argues that chimpanzees demonstrate insight
and the ability to find new ways to achieve their goals. Supporting the idea that chimpanzees
have beliefs and desires is Peter Carruthers’s chapter, in which he argues that even honeybees
and wasps have concepts that make up the beliefs and desires that guide their thinking, and
that insects concepts can meet Gareth Evans’ generality constraint. Similar arguments are
given in the chapter by Michael Tetzlaff and George Rey who argue that honeybee navigation is
evidence of a honeybee language of thought. A different sort of argument in favour of animal
belief comes from the chapter authored by Andrew McAninch, Grant Goodrich, and Colin Allen.
They argue that animals have truth evaluable thoughts since natural communication signals of

animals are compositional, have a determinate reference, a declarative force, and arguably
have a normative element in so far as subjects are sensitive to proper conditions for displaying
a signal (such as a dog giving a play bow before a playful interaction, but not before a serious
bite).
While the above authors are happy to say that animal mental representations take propositional
form, others in the volume suggest that animal thinking may take different forms. Michael
Rescorla argues that animals may be able to solve complex logical tasks using Bayesian
reasoning rather than deductive inference over propositions, thus positioning animals in a kind
of intermediate position in a hierarchy of thinkers. Elizabeth Camp also challenges the idea that
seemingly rational behaviour must be the result of propositional thought; taking as her target
Robert Seyfarth and Dorothy Cheney ’s argument that baboons keep track of their social
relations via a language of thought, Camp argues that alternative representational systems such
as hierarchically structured trees could do the job just as well. Sympathy for non-conceptual
content is also found in José Bermúdez’s paper, and a detailed argument is found in Joëlle
Proust’s essay, though worries are raised in the chapter by Andrew McAninch, Grant Goodrich,
and Colin Allen. These chapters point to the varieties of cognitive tools that animals (and
humans) could use for telling stories about themselves.
A number of papers are also focused on the issue of animal mindreading. José Bermúdez’s
essay focuses on the topic, and offers a helpful conceptual clarification of the various cognitive
capacities that are often unhelpfully lumped together as mindreading. Bermédez argues that
only language users can engage in propositional attitude mindreading, because the
representational vehicle for a propositional attitude displays the structure of the representation,
and only an external natural language can do so. However, there is evidence for what he calls
perceptual mindreading among nonhuman animals.
Bermúdez also brings up a methodological worry with the mindreading research that we saw in
Varner’s text, something he calls the double analogy. We see animals appear to solve social coordination problems that are analogous to those solved by humans, we know that humans solve
these problems by mindreading, and so we conclude that the animals who solve these problems
are also mindreaders. For such an argument to go through, we have to be right that the social
situations are analogous, and that the solutions to the problems are analogous. What humans
often forget is that we are able to function in a complex society without much thought about the
minds of others—we may be wrong that we usually use mindreading to solve our social coordination problems.
How to determine whether animals are engaged in mindreading is covered in the last two
essays. Elliott Sober and Simon Fitzpatrick each examine what it means to look at—and
prefer—lower-level explanations of animal behaviour. Morgan’s Cannon is an oft-stated policy
for animal cognition researchers, warning against seeing a behaviour as the outcome of a
higher mechanism when it could be interpreted as coming form a lower one. However, as Sober
points out, when Morgan’s Cannon is used in conjunction with standard hypothesis testing
methods, it is at best useless and at worst it entails contradictions. Sober advocates switching to
a model evaluation methodology for animal cognition, and using a criterion such the Akaike

Information Criterion to score competing models by determining how well they fit the data and
which is most quantitatively parsimonious. In his chapter, Fitzpatrick examines the claims that
mindreading explanations are simpler than behaviour-reading explanations, and offers the
valuable suggestion that simplicity arguments are really a kind of poverty of the stimulus
argument. By using a deflationary account of simplicity, we can understand mindreading as a
simpler explanation because the wider the range of situations in which subjects demonstrate
sophisticated behaviour, the more difficult it is to explain how subjects acquired the associations
purely behaviourally. The theoretical and methodological issues raised by both essays highlight
how difficult it is to draw simple conclusions from the current body of research on animal
mindreading.
While most of the interest in animal minds has been on the cognitive, narrowly understood, the
chapter by McAninch et al., and Robert C. Roberts’s chapter both draw out the importance of
animal emotions. Roberts takes emotions to be a type of perception that are intrinsically
motivating, such that one need not have a thought in order to act. It is in this chapter that we
see a direct challenge to Varner’s claim that no animal has a narrative sense of self. Roberts
points to the argument of Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth that baboons have a narrativelike understanding of the social relations in their group, given that they recognize who is
vocalizing and the type of vocalization. They take this to be evidence that baboons know who
does what to whom, which is a kind of narrative. Roberts accepts that the baboon’s ability to
collect so much information about others may be something like a narrative, and that they
respond to such information with emotional responses and actions, but given the inability to
construct and present their thoughts in a lengthy sequential series of events, the baboon ability
falls far short of the human skills for storytelling.
These volumes are excellent examples from the bourgeoning field of the philosophy of animal
minds. They should be essential reading for those working to develop a greater understanding
of animals, mind, and ethics.
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